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1. Introduction 
In the standard textbook setting, consumer preferences are assumed to depend on different types of 
goods solely through their respective quantities. Thus, this theory of consumer behavior has been 
developed under specific and well-known assumptions about preferences and choice restrictions 
(budget constraints), and the Paasche and Laspeyres price indexes, up to a first-order (Taylor) 
approximation, have been derived. For this approximation to be valid, certain conditions need to be 
fulfilled (in addition to standard mathematical regularity conditions). These conditions are: (i) the set 
of goods available in the market does not change over time; (ii) the inherent properties of the goods 
also remain unchanged over time, i.e., the notion of quality changes is absent; and (iii) the goods are 
infinitely divisible. If these conditions are not fulfilled, one cannot use the standard theory of 
consumer behavior to justify the indexes mentioned above without further argument.  
 A typical feature of modern markets is that consumers face a variety of products that are 
differentiated with respect to sets of characteristics, which for convenience we shall call “quality” 
attributes. Some of these attributes are tangible and observable, whereas others are not, and such 
attributes may represent fashion or popularity. In addition, for many products, the product variants are 
chosen mutually exclusively, in the sense that only one is selected from the set of feasible variants.  
 In this paper, we extend the traditional price index theory by allowing for indivisible goods 
(discrete goods) characterized by product-specific attributes. The set of variants that appear in the 
market will typically vary from one period to the next so that, in practice, it is hard to observe the 
prices of the same good over time. What complicates the situation further is that even if observable 
product attributes (assuming these are available) do not varyor change slowly over timethe 
popularity of the product may vary considerably. For example, many products, such as clothes, follow 
popularity cycles of the fashion industry. This variation is a consequence of the fact that the average 
preferences in the population for the product in question vary from one period to the next. 
 Some years ago, the so-called Boskin report (Boskin et al., 1996) focused on the need to take 
“quality” into account in price indexes. However, the notion of quality in this context is not new. In 
the 1960s and 1970s, economists started to consider how the empirically oriented theory of price 
indexes should account for changes in quality for markets with differentiated products. Rosen (1974) 
proposed a method for estimating demand and supply functions in markets with differentiated 
products, which, in principle, can be used to estimate supply and demand relations and subsequently 
derive price indexes. However, Rosen’s method has proven to be intractable for applying in practical 
empirical analysis. Furthermore, this method is based on rather stylistic assumptions. It assumes, for 
example, that the variety of product variants is so rich that practically all (“continuous”) combinations 
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of attributes characterizing the product variants exist in the market simultaneously. Accordingly, the 
choice setting is no longer treated as a discrete one, as, under this presumption, one can acquire a 
product variant with any desired attribute combination. Other contributions in this tradition are Bartik 
(1987) and Epple (1987).1 
 In contrast, Trajtenberg (1990) takes the theory of discrete choice as his point of departure to 
establish a true quality adjusted price index. His approach is based on the multinomial logit discrete 
choice demand model. Our contribution in this paper, is to extend Trajtenberg’s approach by (i) 
allowing for latent quality attributes that may vary over time, (ii) accounting for the possibility that 
prices may be endogenous, and (iii) demonstrating that the fraction of consumers that do not purchase 
a variant of the discrete good is, together with the mean population expenditure of the variants 
purchased, sufficient statistics for the quality adjusted price index (given prices of the outside divisible 
goods and a parameter that characterizes the demand of the differentiated product). The theoretical 
basis assumed for the price-setting regime is the assumption of oligopolistic competition, as adapted to 
the case with probabilistic discrete choice demand by Anderson et al. (1992). Other related works in 
this area include Crawford (1997), Feenstra (1995), Jonker (2002) and Song (2005). However, the 
approaches taken by these authors differ from Trajtenberg (1990) and ours. 
 The empirical application aims at estimating quality adjusted price indexes for new 
automobiles in Norway from 1994 to 2002. The main findings are that the standard Laspeyres index 
underestimates the “true” quality adjusted index for some years and overestimates it in other years. 
Moreover, we find that the conventional hedonic price index more or less yields the same figures as 
the Laspeyres index.  
 The paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we discuss the approach proposed by 
Trajtenberg (1990). In Section 3, we review some problems with the interpretation of the hedonic 
regression method. Finally, in Section 4, we discuss an empirical application in a discrete choice 
setting, namely the market for new automobiles in Norway. To compute the quality adjusted price 
index for new automobiles, it is necessary to estimate a key parameter in the demand relation. Here, 
we apply recent likelihood-based methods (Vitorino, 2004) to estimate an equilibrium model under the 
assumption of oligopolistic competition. 
                                                     
1
 There does not seem to be a generally accepted use of the label “hedonic methods”. For example, some authors use the 
terminology hedonic method to mean regression models with prices as the dependent variable and product attributes as 
independent variables (hedonic regression), whereas others use hedonic in a much more general sense. In this paper, we shall 
use the term “hedonic regression” in the same way as Trajtenberg (1990) to mean regression models with log prices as 
dependent variables and product attributes as independent variables. 
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2.  Construction of quality adjusted price indexes for discrete 
goods  
In this section, we discuss the construction of exact quality adjusted price indexes for differentiated 
products. We start by discussing the assumptions about preferences and proceed by investigating their 
implications in the context of price index theory.  
2.1. The case with multinomial logit demand 
We consider a market with a differentiated product (for example, automobiles). Each consumer 
purchases at most one variant of the product in each period, or alternatively, in addition to quantities 
of divisible goods. To make the exposition consistent with the empirical application below, we assume 
that the variants are classified into separate groups indexed by 1,2,..., .g S=  That is, the product 
variants are classified along two dimensions; first they are divided into separate groups, and second 
each group contains different group-specific variants. For example, in the automobile market the 
groups may be different body gr|oups such as Sedan, Station wagon, etc. Let ( )tB g be the set of 
variants within group g that are available in the market at time t. Consumer i has utility function 
)(gU itj of variant j in group g at period t, which is assumed to have the form 
(2.1) ( )( )( ) ( ) ( ),it tjitj tj itj
t
m w g
U g v g g
p
θ
ε
−
= + +  
where itm represents income, wtj(g) is the price of variant j in group g, vtj(g) is a function of attributes 
of variant j in group g, pt is a price index for the divisible (outside) goods, θ  is a positive constant and 
εitj(g) are random variables that represent unobserved heterogeneity in tastes. The alternative of not 
buying is indexed by 0j g= = , where 0 (0)it it tU m p=θ . The terms ( )tjv g , 1, 2,...t = , 1, 2,...,s S= , 
can be interpreted as a quality indicator that is supposed to capture such effects as the fluctuations in 
average population popularity of variant j in group g. In this paper, we assume that the random error 
terms are i.i.d., independent of the other terms of the utility function and with extreme value c.d.f. 
(2.2) ( ) ( )( ) exp −≤ = − xitjP g x eε . 
It is well known (cf. McFadden, 1984) that this implies that  
(2.3) ( ) ( )( )( )
( )
exp ( ) ( )( ) max max ( ) ( )
exp ( ) ( ) 1∈
∈
−
= = ≡
− +∑ ∑

t
t
tj tj
itj itk tj
r k B r
tk tk
r k B r
v g w g
P U g U r Q g
v r w r
θ
θ
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for ( ),∈ tj B g  whereas for 0j g= = , we have 
(2.4) ( ) ( )0 0( )
( )
1(0) max max ( )
exp ( ) ( ) 1∈
∈
= = ≡
− +∑ ∑ t
t
it itk t
r k B r
tk tk
r k B r
P U U r Q
v r w r θ
, 
where ( ) ( )tj tj tw g w g p= . As is well known, the model given in (2.3) and (2.4) satisfies the 
Independence from Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA) property, which in some cases is known to be 
restrictive. 
2.2. The Trajtenberg approach 
Now, suppose that the parameters of the demand model given in (2.3) and (2.4) have been estimated. 
Then, one can readily calculate quality adjusted price indexes by means of the expenditure function as 
proposed by Trajtenberg (1990). We shall now explain Trajtenberg’s approach. Assume that the utility 
structure is given by (2.1) and let itV  denote the indirect utility conditional on the choice set, attributes, 
price and income, defined by 
(2.5) ( )0( )max max max ( ), )∈= tit itk itg k B gV U g U . 
It is well known (Trajtenberg, 1990) that the assumptions above lead to the following expression for 
the aggregate (mean) indirect utility 
(2.6) ( ) ( )0( ) 1 ( )max max max ( ), log 1 exp ( ) ( )t t
S
t it itk it it tk tkg k B g g k B g
V EV E U g U m v g w g
∈
= ∈
  
= = = + + −     ∑ ∑ θ θ . 
The interpretation of (2.6) is that it expresses mean indirect utility given the choice set, observed and 
unobserved attributes, prices and income. Let 1 2 1( (1), (1),... (2),...)t t t tv v v=v  and 
1 2 1 2( (1), (1),...., (2), (2),...).t t t t tw w w w=w  From (2.6), it follows that the corresponding aggregate 
(mean) expenditure function, ( ), , , ,t t t te p B uv w , is given by 
(2.7) ( ) ( )1
1 ( )
, , , , log 1 exp ( ) ( )
t
S
t t t t tk tk
g k B g
e p B u u v g w g−
= ∈
  
= − + −     ∑ ∑ θ θv w , 
where u is the given utility level divided by θ . We define the quality-adjusted price index 
(Trajtenberg), tδ , as determined by 
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(2.8)  ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1, , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,− − − − − − − − − − −− = −t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t te p B u e p B u e p B u e p B uδv w v w v w v w , 
which is equivalent to 
(2.9) ( ) ( )1 1 1 1,1, , , / ,1, ,− − − −= t t t t t t t t te , B u e p p B uδv w v w . 
The interpretation of tδ is as follows: from period 1−t  to t, there has been a possible change in the 
choice set, the attributes and the prices of the discrete goods from ( )1 1 1, ,t t tB− − −v w  to ( ), ,t t tBv w . The 
left-hand side of (2.8) expresses the actual change in the mean welfare in a money metric measure. 
The right-hand side represents the change in the mean value given that the choice set is kept fixed and 
equal to the initial choice set with variants that have initial attributes, but where the initial prices are 
rescaled by the same factor tδ . This factor is determined so that the actual change in welfare becomes 
equal to the change in welfare caused solely by the scale transformation of the initial prices 
represented by tδ . Note that tδ  is a conditional index that only captures the welfare change of the 
discrete good. The interpretation of tδ  is as an index that represents the welfare effect of the actual 
change that has taken place in the prices, choice set and attributes from period 1−t  to t. From (2.4), 
(2.7) and (2.9), we find that tδ  is determined by the equation 
(2.10) ( ) ( )
1
1, 1, 1
1 ( ) 1 ( )
exp ( ) ( ) exp ( ) ( ) / .
t t
S S
tk tk t k t t k t t
g k B g g k B g
v g w g v g w g p p
−
− − −
= ∈ = ∈
   
− = −      ∑ ∑ ∑ ∑ θ θδ  
The right-hand side of (2.10) is strictly decreasing in tδ  and, consequently, equation (2.10) determines 
tδ  uniquely. Once { ( )}tjv g have been specified, andθ and the parameters of { ( )}tjv g have been 
estimated, one can compute the price index by solving for tδ in the nonlinear equation (2.10). 
2.3. Further implications from the multinomial logit demand model 
A serious challenge one faces in the context of empirical application is how to specify the 
terms{ ( )}.tjv g  In general, these terms may vary over time in a way that is not captured by observable 
variant-or group specific attributes. To this end, we shall in this section explore a type of 
“semiparametric” approach, as we shall now explain. Note that it follows from (2.4) that (2.10) can be 
written as 
(2.11) ( )
1
1
0 1, 1, 1
1 ( )
1 exp ( ) ( ) / .
t
S
t t k t t k t t
g k B g
Q v g w g p p
−
−
− − −
= ∈
 
− = −  ∑ ∑ θδ  
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Furthermore, (2.4) implies that 
(2.12) ( )
0
( )
exp ( ) ( )= − tj tj tj
t
Q g
v g w gQ θ . 
From (2.12) it follows that  
(2.13) ( ) ( )( )
1 1
1, 1, 1, 1 1,
( ) ( )
exp ( ) ( ) ( )exp 1 ( )
− −
− − − − −
∈ ∈
− = −∑ ∑ 
t t
t k t k t k t t t t k
k B g k B g
v g w g Q g p p w gθ δ θ . 
As a consequence, (2.11) and (2.13) imply that the price index is determined by 
(2.14) ( )( )
1
1
0 1, 1 1,
( )
1 ( )exp 1 ( )
t
t t k t t t t k
g k B g
Q Q g p p w g
−
−
− − −
∈
− = −∑ ∑ δ θ . 
Thus, when θ has been estimated, one can use (2.14) to compute the quality-adjusted price index by 
solving for tδ in (2.14) without relying on the specification and estimates of { ( )}.tjv g   
 One can often use a more simple formula derived from an approximation of the left hand 
side of (2.14). This approximation is close when 11 −− t t tp pδ  is small, which is usually the case. If so, 
it follows by a first order Taylor expansion of the left hand side of (2.14) that the approximate solution 
for the price index determined by (2.14) is given by 
(2.15) 1,0 0
1 1
1
1 t ttt
t t
Q Qp
p y
δ
θ
−
− −
− 
≅ +  
, 
where ty  is the mean deflated expenditure of the discrete good in period t given by 
(2.16) 
( )
( ) ( ).
t
t tk tk
g k B g
y w g Q g
∈
=∑ ∑   
The formula in (2.15) is quite interesting because it shows that, in addition to the previous period’s 
expenditure on the discrete good, the change in the relative fraction of consumers who do not purchase 
a variant (or equivalently, the fraction of consumers who do purchase a variant) summarizes the 
welfare price effect of changes in tastes, prices and the choice set. As mentioned above, our approach 
to price index measurement accounts for the fact that people may prefer not to buy a new variant in a 
given period t (say), which implies an increase in 0.tQ This will happen if the unobserved quality 
attributes{ ( )}tjv g decrease in period t. Recall that this effect cannot be captured by the Laspeyres index 
because it gives no weight to individuals who do not purchase a car. Furthermore, recall that the index 
given in (2.15) takes into account that the choice set of available variants may vary from one year to 
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the next. In addition, this effect is not captured by the Laspeyres index. If the latent quality attributes 
{ ( )}tjv g were not changing over time, the Laspeyres index would overestimate the price effect because 
it does not take into account changes in consumers’ choice set and the possibility of no purchase. This 
is because, if the set of feasible variants increases from one period to the next, consumers will have 
more choices than before and therefore will be able to do better than before, and this welfare gain is 
unaccounted for in the Laspeyres index (Pakes et al., 1993). However, as the latent quality attributes 
may change over time, the sign of the difference between the Laspeyres price index and the quality-
adjusted price index developed in this paper is ambiguous. 
2.4. Aggregation of subindexes for discrete goods 
The Laspeyres and Paasche price indexes possess the property that one can conveniently combine 
subindexes to obtain aggregate indexes by adding the respective subindexes multiplied by the relevant 
budget shares. In this section, we shall discuss aggregation of subindexes for discrete goods. 
 Let ( )tV g  be the mean conditional indirect utility at period t given group g. Formally ( )tV g  
is defined by 
(2.17) ( )( )( ) max ( )tt itkk B gV g E U g∈= . 
Similarly to (2.6), it follows that 
(2.18) ( )
( )
( ) log exp ( ) ( )
t
t it tk tk
k B g
V g m v g w gθ θ
∈
 
= + −   ∑  . 
The corresponding conditional mean expenditure function is given by 
(2.19) ( ) ( )1
( )
( ), ( ), , ( ), log exp ( ) ( )
t
t t t t tk tk
k B g
e g g p B g u u v g w g−
∈
 
= − −  ∑ θ θv w . 
Similarly to (2.9), it follows that the price index for group g is determined by 
(2.20) ( ) ( )1 1 1 1( ), ( ),1, ( ), ( ), ( ) ( ) ,1, ( ),t t t t t t t t te g g B g u e g g w g p p B g u− − − −= δv w v . 
If we combine (2.18) and (2.20) it follows that the price index for group g, ( )t gδ , is determined by 
the equation 
(2.21) ( ) ( )
1
1, 1, 1
( ) ( )
exp ( ) ( ) exp ( ) ( ) ( )
t t
tk tk t k t k t t t
k B g k B g
v g w g v g w g g p pθ θ δ
−
− − −
∈ ∈
− = −∑ ∑  . 
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In Appendix B, we prove that, to a first-order Taylor approximation, we have that 
(2.22) 
1
1
( ) ( )
( )
t t
g
t
t
g
g y g
y g
δ
δ
−
−
≅
∑
∑ , 
where ( )ty g is the mean deflated expenditure within group g in period t, defined by 
(2.23) 
( )
( ) ( ) ( )
t
t tk tk
k B g
y g Q g w g
∈
= ∑  . 
Equation (2.22) states that one can obtain the aggregate price index for the differentiated good, say 
cars, in the same way as for the conventional Laspeyres index, namely by adding the subindexes 
weighted by their respective budget shares as of the previous period. 
 Finally, let us derive an approximate closed form expression for ( )t gδ , similarly to (2.15). 
Let ( )tQ g denote the fraction of consumers that purchase a variant within group g in period t. By first-
order Taylor expansion, we find that 
(2.24) 
1
1 1
1,0 0 1 1, 1,
( )
( )( ) ( ) ( ) 1
t
t t
t t t t t k t k
k B g t
g pQ Q Q g Q g Q w g
p
δθ
−
−
−
− − − −
∈
 
= + −  ∑  , 
which implies that 
(2.25) ( )11 1,0 0
1 1
( ) ( )
( ) 1 ( )
t t t tt
t
t t
Q g Q g Q Qp
g
p y g
−
− −
− −
 
− = +  
δ
θ
. 
Similarly to (2.15), the index formula in (2.25) depends crucially on the fraction of consumers that do 
not purchase any variant, and in addition on the fraction of the demand that is allocated to group g. 
Thus, this means that the welfare effect of changes in prices of the respective variants and changes in 
the choice sets are fully captured through these fractional consumption terms, provided the 
approximation based on the first order Taylor expansion is viewed as sufficiently accurate. 
3.  Empirical analysis of the market for new automobiles in 
Norway 
In this section, we report empirical results based on the methods discussed above for index 
construction.  
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3.1. Data 
The automobile sales data are obtained from the Information Council for Road Traffic, Inc. These data 
contain information about prices from each of the individual automobile import firms. The sales data 
on quantities contain information about the number of cars sold in each month, from 1993 until 2001, 
on the following disaggregate level: brand, make, body, number of doors, engine performance, engine 
volume and number of driveshafts. The set of automobile variants are all the combinations of body, 
make, model, engine performance and number of driveshafts. The price data are based on the prices 
set by the firms that import automobiles, and may therefore differ somewhat from the actual market 
prices. The prices include indirect taxes, but do not include the cost associated with registration and 
possible transportation costs associated with delivery. The cost of possible supplementary equipment 
is not included in the price. There are some problems associated with the merging of the price data file 
and the file on quantities. The reason for this is that different definitions of categories have been used 
sometimes for the price data and the quantity data. In addition, the price data and the quantity data are 
given on different aggregation levels. In particular, there seems to be problems with linking quantity 
and price data for those brands for which the demand is low. No information about possible 
supplementary equipment is recorded. We have chosen to estimate yearly prices as the average of the 
prices in January, June and December each year. Data on cars privately imported to Norway are not 
available. Summary statistics of the data are given in Appendix C. 
3.2. Estimation of the multinomial logit demand model with endogenous prices 
As mentioned in Section 2, in many cases, it is not possible to explain fluctuations in { }( )tjv g  by 
observable attributes. As regards automobiles, Table C1 shows that the fractional demand for sedan 
cars decreases from 0.34 in 1994 to 0.13 in 2002, whereas the fractional demand for station wagons 
increases from 0.25 in 1994 to 0.51 in 2002. The prices (Table C3) do not change much during this 
period and Table C2 shows that, for both types of car, the increase in the choice sets of variants is 
large. Thus, neither price changes nor other observable attributes are capable of explaining these 
trends in the demand. In the empirical analysis, the groups of variants are the three body types 
“Combi”, “Sedan” and “Station wagon”. We assume that 
(3.1) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )= + + +tj tj j t tjv g z g g gβ ξ µ η , 
for ( )∈ tj B g , where the zj-variables we use are fuel consumptions (liters per km) and engine 
performance, and β  is a vector of unknown parameters. The term ( )t gµ  is the mean utility of the 
variants within body group g in period t, whereas ( )j gξ  represents the deviation in mean utility of 
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variant j from the mean utility ( )t gµ  within a given body group g. Note that ( )j gξ is assumed not to 
depend on time. This restriction is a crucial for achieving identification. The terms { }( )tj gη  are zero 
mean disturbances.  
 Next, consider the estimation procedure. From (2.3) and (3.1), it follows that the probability 
of purchasing variant j in period t, given that variant j and variant 1 belong to body group g, is equal to 
(3.2) 1 1 1
1
( )
log ( ) ( ( ) ( )) ( ( ) ( )) ( ) ( )( )
tj
j tj t tj t tj t
t
Q g
g z g z g w g w g g gQ g ξ β θ η η
∗
 
= + − − − + −  
 
 
for ,1 ( )tj B g∈ , where 1( ) ( ) ( ).j jg g gξ ξ ξ∗ = −  
 Next, consider the price-setting rule. We assume that prices are determined according to a 
setting with oligopolistic competition. It is assumed that each “producer” produces only one variant of 
automobile. Let ctj(g) denote the marginal cost of firm j (the firm that produces variant j) of type g in 
period t. Then, the expected profit of firm j of type g, conditional on prices, equals 
(3.3) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )tjg t tj tj tj t tjw g c g Q g M K= − −π w , 
where tM  is the total number of consumers in year t and Kjt represents fixed costs. In the following, 
we assume that the quality indicators { }( )jtv g  are exogenously given to the firms, and that firm j of 
type g maximizes (3.3) with respect to its own price wjt(g), taking the prices of other firms as given. In 
reality this assumption may not hold; it could be that firms take into account the demand for different 
“qualities”when setting prices. The first-order conditions that correspond to this maximization 
problem are given by 
(3.4) ( )( )
1( ) ( )
1tj tj tj
w g c g
Q g
= +
−
 
θ
, 
for 1,2,...=j , where ( ) jtc g ( ) .jt tc g p=  Recall that{ ( )}tjQ g depend on prices, although this is 
suppressed in the notation. Anderson, Palma and Thisse (1992) have shown that there exists a unique 
price equilibrium determined by (3.4). Note that since marginal costs are positive the price equilibrium 
condition in (3.4) implies that ( )( )( ) 1 1.tj tjw g Q gθ − >  As regards the empirical specification of the 
price equation, we assume that  
(3.5) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )= + +tj j t tjc g b g d g gκ , 
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with the normalization ( ) 0,jj b g =∑ where ( )jb g  and ( )td g  are unknown parameters and { ( )}tj gκ  
are random error terms. Note that similarly to the specification of the latent quality attribute above, 
{ ( )}jb g  does not depend on time. Next, we assume that the random error terms { }( )tj gη are 
independent and normally distributed with zero mean and variance 2 ( ),s g depending on g, and 
{ }( )tj gκ  are independent and normally distributed with zero mean and variance 2 ( ),r g depending on 
g. Moreover, ( )tj gκ  and ( )k gτη  are independent for all j, k, t and τ. In addition, the error terms in 
different body groups are assumed to be independent. Note that { ( )}tjw g  are endogenous because they 
depend on the endogenous fractional demands, { ( )},tjQ g  through (3.4). Consequently, we cannot 
estimate θ  by OLS. For the same reason we cannot estimate the price relations in (3.4) by OLS. In 
Appendix B, we demonstrate that the likelihood function is given by 
 
(3.6)
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∈
    = − − − − + − +       
    
− − − − + +  
−   
∑ ∑ ∑
∑ ∑ ∑
 

 
 
where J is the Jacobian associated with the transformation of the disturbances to the dependent 
variables, when the disturbances are viewed as functions of the dependent variables (prices and 
quantities sold) given by (3.2), (3.4) and (3.5). It turns out that this Jacobian does not depend on any of 
the unknown parameters of the model (Vitorino, 2004). In the actual estimation procedure, { }( )tjQ g  
are replaced by their corresponding observed frequencies { }ˆ ( )tjQ g . However, the errors 
{ }ˆ ( ) ( )−tj tjQ g Q g  are negligible. The loglikelihood function in (3.6) takes into account the fact that 
prices and fractional demands are endogenous variables. The estimation procedure now goes as 
follows. First, we maximize logL with respect to the parameters { * ( )j gξ }, { ( )}jc g  and { ( )}.tb g The 
corresponding first-order conditions for this problem can be readily solved for these parameters. 
Second, we insert the formulas for the parameters { * ( )j gξ }, { ( )}jc g  and { ( )},tb g  obtained from the 
first-order conditions, into the loglikelihood function in (3.6) and we subsequently maximize the 
resulting loglikelihood function (given in (B.13) in Appendix B) with respect to the remaining 
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parameters β, θ, { ( )}r g  and { ( )}.r g  More precise details of this procedure are given in Appendix B. 
The estimates of θ  and the variances r(g) and ( ), 1,2,3=s g g , are given in Table 1 above.  
 From Table 1, we see that the observable attributes “fuel consumption” and “engine 
performance” are not significant. Thus, “price” is the only observable attribute that correlates 
significantly with demand. 
 
Table 1. Estimates of structural parameters 
Variable Parameter Estimate t-statistics 
Fuel consumption β1         0.2019 × 10–2   1.4 
Engine performance (kW) β2         0.2018 × 10–2   1.4 
Price 510−×  θ         1.4985 16.9 
Standard errors of tastes:    
    Combi s(1) 0.952 54.9 
    Sedan s(2) 1.270 60.6 
    Station wagon s(3) 1.009 61.4 
Standard errors of marginal costs:    
    Combi r(1) 0.112 55.5 
    Sedan r(2) 0.284 60.7 
    Station wagon r(4) 0.218 62.1 
 
 We also carried out an estimation based solely on the demand relation in (3.2) and found that 
the parameters β1, β2, r(1), r(2), r(3) and θ are practically equal to the estimates reported in Table 1. 
This means that OLS estimation based on (3.3) can be applied in this case. Therefore, we conclude 
that, without further knowledge or assumptions about marginal costs, the prices set by the firms in 
such a way that they are only weakly correlated with the disturbances, { }( ) .tj gη  Alternatively, prices 
may be determined by some mechanism other than the simple oligopolistic price setting theory 
suggested above. Hence, the assumption of normally distributed error terms is not needed. However, 
an obvious weakness with our price-setting model in (3.4) is that only new cars are taken into account; 
the market for used cars is neglected. 
3.3. Calculation of a quality adjusted price index for the nested multinomial logit model 
In this section, we consider the calculation of price indexes based on the nested multinomial logit 
demand model for new automobiles. Let ( )tjN g  denote the number of variants of type j within body 
type g sold in year t. From (2.14) it follows that 
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(3.7) ( )( )
1
1
1, 0
1 1, 1
( ) 1 1,0
ˆ( ) 1
exp 1 ( )
ˆ 1
−
−
−
− −
−
∈
−
−
−
− =
−
∑ ∑ 
t
t k t
t t t t k
g k B g t t
N g Q
p p w g
N Q
δ θ . 
The fraction 1−t tp p  is estimated by the conventional Laspeyres index for the goods other than new 
cars. A simple version of the conventional Laspeyres index for new cars, Ltδ , is calculated as 
 
Table 2. Different of price indexes for all new automobiles (percent), multinomial logit model 
All automobiles 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
The Laspeyres 
index for new 
automobiles 
100 102.5 98.2 100.8 102.2 101.9 103.1 106.5 108.2 
The Laspeyres 
index for other 
goods (pt) 
100 103.6 104.4 107.1 109.7 112.6 116.4 119.9 121.4 
Hedonic 
regression 100 102.1 96.3 98.6 98.7 97.8 97.8 104.3 106.0 
Quality adjusted 
index, 1.5θ =  
(estimated value) 
100 101.4 94.1 97.7 97.9 106.0 111,2 115.2 116.2 
First-order 
approximation of 
the quality 
adjusted index, 
(eq. 2.15), θ = 1.5 
100 101.5 93.1 97.1 97.8 105.9 111.7 116.3 117.8 
Quality adjusted 
index with other 
values of θ  
         
θ = 2.1 100 102.0 97.0 100.4 101.2 108.0 112.8 116.6 117.8 
θ = 1.9 100 101.9 96.2 99.7 100.3 107.5 112.4 116.3 117.4 
θ = 1.7 100 101.7 95.3 98.8 99.2 106.9 111.9 115.8 116.8 
θ = 1.3 100 101.1 92.5 96.2 96.1 105.0 110.4 114.3 115.3 
θ = 1.1 100 100.6 90.4 94.3 93.7 103.5 109.1 113.2 114.0 
θ = 0.9 100 99.9 87.4 91.4 90.3 101.3 107.3 111.4 112.1 
Fraction of 
persons 16–66 
years of age that 
buy a new car 
0.030 0.032 0.041 0.039 0.041 0.034 0.032 0.031 0.031 
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(3.8) 
1,
( )
1, 1,
( )
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
−
∈
− −
∈
=
∑ ∑
∑ ∑t
t
tj t j
g j C gL
t
t j t j
g j C g
w g N g
w g N g
δ , 
where 1( ) ( ) ( )−= ∩t t tC g B g B g . In Table 2, we report the calculation of different price indexes. We see 
that the Laspeyres index is higher than the quality adjusted price index up to 1997, whereas, from 
1998 onwards, it yields lower figures than the quality adjusted index. The quality adjusted index drops 
from 101.4 percent to 94.1 percent from 1995 to 1996, and increases rapidly from 97.9 percent in 1998 
to 111.2 percent in 2000. One important reason why the increase in the demand from 1995 to 1996 is 
so high is that the condemnation deposit was increased in 1996 in order to increase condemnation and 
stimulate the purchase of new and more environmentally efficient cars.  
 We have also used the approximation formula given in (2.15) to calculate the quality 
adjusted price index. From Table 2 we see that the figures produced by (2.15) are close to the exact 
index figures determined by (3.7). 
 Moreover, we have applied the hedonic regression method to calculate a hedonic price index. 
We refer to Appendix A for an explanation and critique of the hedonic method. The hedonic 
regression estimates are given in Table C7 in Appendix C. We note that from 1999 the hedonic index 
yields considerably lower figures than the quality adjusted price index and it is also somewhat lower 
than the Laspeyres price index.  
 Further down in Table 2, we have calculated the quality adjusted index for different values 
of θ. From the results, we can conclude that the index changes little when θ  varies from 1.3 to 1.7. 
Even when θ  varies from 1.1 to 1.9, the changes in the index are moderate in most cases.  
 From Table 2 we note that the fluctuations in the quality adjusted price index follow closely 
the fluctuations in the fraction of consumers that purchase (do not purchase) a car (last row in the 
table). The reason for this is apparent when we look at the index formula (2.15). Recall that this does 
not mean that the effects of changes in prices, choice sets and latent quality attributes are ignored, but 
simply that, under the assumptions of our demand model, these effects are captured by the fraction of 
consumers that do not purchase a variant (in the respective periods). 
4. Conclusion 
In this paper, we have developed a particular approach for calculating quality adjusted price indexes in 
markets with differentiated products. We have discussed how one can use the theory of discrete choice 
to derive exact price indexes that account for quality changes. Our approach is an extension of 
Trajtenberg’s method that explicitly takes into account the discrete choice setting, allowing for 
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endogenous time-varying latent quality attributes and the option of not purchasing any variant of the 
discrete good. A key result established is that the fraction of consumers that do not purchase a variant 
of the differentiated product, and the mean population expenditure on the variants purchased, 
constitute sufficient statistics for the calculation of the quality adjusted price index, given the prices of 
the outside divisible goods and the price parameter θ  in the demand function. 
 Our empirical application is based on data on sales of new automobiles in Norway. The results 
show that adjusting for quality implies a decrease in the corresponding price index until 1998 
compared with the Laspeyres price index for automobiles, and an increase from 1999 to 2002. In parti 
cular, the fluctuation of the quality adjusted index parallels the fluctuations in the fraction of 
consumers that do not purchase a car (or equivalently, the fraction or persons that purchase a car). For 
example, from the last row in Table 2 we note that the fraction of persons that purchase a car increases 
a lot from 1995 to 1996 and decreases rapidly from 1998 to 1999. The corresponding quality adjusted 
price index decreases sharply from 1995 to 1996 and increases sharply from 1998 to 1999. This is due 
to the fact that, in addition to the mean population expenditure on the discrete product, changes in the 
fraction of consumers that do not purchase a car fully captures the cost of living effects of changes in 
choice sets, prices and latent quality.  
We have also applied the hedonic regression method. The results show that the hedonic 
regression method produces lower estimated than the quality adjusted price index from 1999. 
 The methodology applied in this paper depends crucially on the specification of the demand 
model. In our model, the utility function is linear in income, and this property implies that the demand 
model does not depend on income. Researchers such as Pakes et al. (1993), Berry et al. (1995), Nevo 
(2003) and Vitorino (2004) have carried out empirical demand analyses based on a more general 
structure of the demand model with time-constant latent quality attributes. However, only Pakes et al. 
(1993) have calculated quality adjusted price indexes, under the restriction that the latent quality 
attributes are constant over time. Third, the modeling framework discussed in this paper is purely 
static, whereas automobiles are important durables that cannot be satisfactorily analyzed without an 
intertemporal modeling framework that incorporates consumers’ expectations and uncertainties. 
Unfortunately, however, this is a very demanding task and is far beyond the scope of the present 
analysis. 
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Appendix A 
The hedonic regression approach 
For the sake of relating the theoretical development above to the conventional literature on hedonic 
price regressions, we now consider the deterministic case with no random error term in the utility 
function given in (2.1). In this case, we shall review a possible theoretical motivation for the hedonic 
regression approach. The discussion is similar to Trajtenberg (1990, pp. 35–37). Let 
 0 ,
   ∑ k tkkU x x µ  
be the utility function of the consumers where xk is the quantity of product variant 0k > , 0x  represents 
the quantity of other goods, U is a quasi-concave and increasing function and 0tkµ >  are weights that 
are supposed to represent “quality”. The form of the utility function means that there is perfect 
substitution between quality and quantity. The utility function above is equal for all consumers. In this 
case, it follows that only a single variant will be demanded unless the quality-adjusted prices are equal 
(A.1) 1
1
tj t
tj t
w w
µ µ
= . 
The quality price index in this case can thus be expressed as 
(A.2) 1 1
1,1 1,1
t t
t
t t
w
w
µδ
µ
− −
= . 
Assume now that 
(A.3) log  =  
tj
tj
t
z
p
µ β , 
where ztj is a vector of suitable observed attributes of variant j. Then, we can write (3.1) as 
(A.4) ln log= + +tj t tj tw z pα β , 
where 
 1 1lnt t twα µ= − . 
Hence, the period specific intercept αt can be used to compute δt because (A.2) implies that 
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(A.5) ( )1
1
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−
−
−
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t t t
t
t
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α αδ . 
 There are several shortcomings with the conventional hedonic regression approach outlined 
here. First, as population heterogeneity is ignored, eq. (A.1) must hold in order to be consistent with 
the observed fact that there is positive demand for each variant in the market. However, this implies 
that consumers will be indifferent with respect to the different variants, which seems rather unrealistic. 
Second, the hedonic approach ignores the effect of variations in the choice set. Specifically, in a 
dynamic market, some variants disappear whereas others emerge as a result of innovations. The 
quality adjusted index approaches discussed in Section 2 explicitly take the choice set Bt into account, 
whereas the hedonic approach fails in this respect. We refer readers to Hulten (2003) and the 
references therein for a critical review of additional aspects of the hedonic regression method. 
Computed from Estimated Demand Systems.  
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Appendix B 
 
Aggregation of subindexes; proof of eq. (2.22): 
Let 
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The left hand side of (2.21) is equal to 0( )t tQ g Q  so that (2.21) can be expressed as 
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We immediately note that when (B.1) is aggregated over g the left hand side of (B.1) becomes equal to 
1
0 1tQ− − . Hence (2.11) and (B.1) imply that 
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Similarly to (2.14) it follows that (B.1) can be written as 
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A first order Taylor expansion of both sides of (B.4) yields 
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which implies that 
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 This completes the proof. 
  Q.E.D. 
 
Maximum likelilhood estimation; proof of the claim that the likelihood function has the 
form given in (3.6): 
Consider first the demand relations in (3.2). The part of the likelihood function that corresponds to 
(3.2) for body group g at time t (disregarding the Jacobian) equals 
(B.7)
2
1 1 1 2
( )\{1} 1
( ) 1
exp log ( ) ( ( ) ( )) ( ( ) ( )) ( ) log ( )( ) 2 ( )
∗
∈
    
− − − − + − + −       
∏  
t
tj
j tj t tj t t
j B g t
Q g
E g z g z g w g w g g s gQ g s gξ β θ η
 
where the expectation is taken with respect to { }1( )t gη . Let 
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Then one can express (B.7) as 
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Now observe that (3.2) implies that ( ) 0,tR g⋅ ≈  so that (B.8) reduces to 
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where ( )tn g  is the number of variants in { }( ) \ 1tB g . 
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 Furthermore, we have that 
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By change of variable; 1 ( ) ( )ty x n g s g= +  we obtain that the last integral reduces to 
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Thus, we have proved that (B.8) equals 
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Hence, we have proved that (B.7) can be written as 
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Consequently, it follows from (3.4), (3.5) and (B.9) that the loglikelihood function is given by  
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where J is the Jacobian associated with the transformation of variables, from 
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and 
(B.12) ( )
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θ
. 
It can be readily demonstrated (see Dagsvik and Liu, 2002) that the Jacobian J is independent of the 
unknown parameters of the model. See also Vitorino (2004) who has demonstrated this for the case 
with few variants. The Jacobian is therefore irrelevant for the solution of the maximization problem 
above, and it can be removed from the likelihood function. Let ( )tjN g  be the number of variants sold 
of type j within body type g, Nt(g) the number of variants within Bt(g), and Nt the total number of 
variants sold. For notational convenience let us now introduce the notation 
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T
, 
where 0

tQ  denotes an estimate of 0tQ  and T is the number of years we have observations for. If we 
use the first order conditions and solve for the intercepts and subsequently insert into the likelihood 
function we obtain that the remaining parameters θ, 2 ( )s g , 2 ( )r g , 1,2,3=g , can be estimated by 
maximizing 
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Appendix C 
 
Summary statistics 
Table C 1. Number of new cars sold by year and body of car 
 Body of car 
Year Combi Sedan Station wagon Other carmakers 
 Fractions Levels Fractions Levels Fractions Levels Fractions Levels 
Total 
sales 
1994 0.41 32 226 0.34 26 406 0.25 19 605 0.003    246   78 483 
1995 0.43 36 043 0.33 28 307 0.23 19 790 0.004    369   84 509 
1996 0.46 49 794 0.27 29 810 0.25 27 672 0.012 1 276 108 552 
1997 0.40 40 983 0.28 28 495 0.31 32 465 0.014 1 414 103 357 
1998 0.39 41 608 0.22 23 568 0.38 40 677 0.016 1 667 107 520 
1999 0.36 32 229 0.20 18 064 0.42 37 736 0.015 1 354   89 383 
2000 0.37 31 336 0.18 15 005 0.44 37 828 0.015 1 323   85 492 
2001 0.35 29 496 0.17 14 514 0.46 38 583 0.013 1 081   83 674 
2002 0.35 29 312 0.13 10 927 0.51 42 815 0.013 1 086   84 140 
 
Table C 2. Number of variants of cars in the market each year 
Type of body 
Year 
Combi Variants 
entering 
Variants 
dis-
appearing 
Sedan Variants 
entering 
Variants 
dis-
appearing 
Station 
wagon 
Variants 
entering 
Variants 
dis-
appearing 
1994 149   177   129   
1995 153   174   124   
1996 186   214   170   
1997 162   188   194   
1998 173   195   226   
1999 158   205   244   
2000 182   221   271   
2001 184   237   277   
2002 203   239   303   
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Table C 3. Mean deflated prices across cars within type of body. NOK 
Type of body/Year min. max. mean st.dev. 
Combi     
1994 89 450 637 600 219 286 90 705 
1995 84 336 583 398 215 598 85 218 
1996 85 462 488 506 198 353 70 468 
1997 92 904 463 658 193 107 66 530 
1998 89 304 446 126 189 628 64 004 
1999 95 826 468 561 187 250 56 987 
2000 95 132 453 265 183 292 55 149 
2001 97 262 453 628 194 480 60 224 
2002 102 883 445 634 194 556 59 859 
Sedan     
1994 110 533 1 267 650 327 336 179 339 
1995 112 058 1 423 745 329 694 201 014 
1996 109 642 1 577 267 323 329 213 100 
1997 111 173 1 554 622 328 238 207 109 
1998 101 094 1 312 671 330 469 190 127 
1999 98 490 1 171 942 316 451 167 568 
2000 127 513 1 262 887 323 045 176 836 
2001 130 901 2 551 376 371 085 256 676 
2002 133 773 2 606 575 371 043 244 822 
Station wagon     
1994 117 756   765 800 342 997 140 346 
1995 114 431 1 008 340 347 671 158 999 
1996 125 239   871 648 319 025 127 045 
1997 128 758 1 101 774 328 810 149 672 
1998 121 263   935 886 302 236 140 331 
1999 117 022   882 179 273 770 115 359 
2000 107 732   932 131 291 965 143 046 
2001 107 812   929 358 309 760 144 710 
2002 112 109 1 093 081 320 761 156 064 
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Table C 4. Number of new combi cars sold by year and make of car 
Make of car 
Year 
Alfa Romeo Audi BMW Citroen Daewoo Daihatsu 
1994 -  -  134  2370  -  219  
1995 -  -  150  1817  130  58  
1996 -  273  282  2035  251  19  
1997 -  1142  228  1426  257  278  
1998 -  948  106  1440  178  111  
1999 -  853  47  929  72  229  
2000 -  922  13  541  219  367  
2001 113  731  100  935  262  180  
2002 93  697  128  1125  58  204  
Make of car 
Year 
Fiat Ford Honda Hyundai Kia Lada 
1994 637  3142  354  516  -  94  
1995 1022  3465  695  2209  -  231  
1996 651  4159  1259  3546  372  136  
1997 871  4378  1236  2196  680  85  
1998 715  3146  630  1866  716  57  
1999 273  2973  205  1327  601  12  
2000 306  2885  120  1336  274  -  
2001 507  2476  407  933  308  -  
2002 469  2477  639  844  632  -  
Make of car 
Year 
Mazda Mitsubishi Nissan Opel Peugoet Renault 
1994 1947  928  2336  3611  2715  2117  
1995 1334  741  2244  3495  2161  2446  
1996 2849  1959  3091  4549  2528  2939  
1997 2649  984  3538  3859  1872  2191  
1998 1582  990  2763  4780  1176  1634  
1999 1407  728  1657  3396  2282  1197  
2000 1129  562  2076  2125  2345  900  
2001 792  441  1309  2546  3027  1371  
2002 701  381  1166  1697  3403  920  
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Table C 4 (cont.). Number of new combi cars sold by year and make of car 
Make of car 
Year 
Rover Saab Seat Skoda Subaru 
1994 -  949  402  288  133  
1995 -  1844  637  724  135  
1996 386  2209  621  844  560  
1997 245  1959  739  977  848  
1998 245  1568  765  1548  214  
1999 213  1689  660  1265  159  
2000 102  1436  655  1570  100  
2001 42  1122  578  906  118  
2002 29  963  441  722  119  
Make of car 
Year 
Suzuki Toyota Volkswagen Volvo 
1994 237  3797  5299  208  
1995 248  3099  7199  100  
1996 351  4806  9259  58  
1997 305  5094  7382  -  
1998 324  4661  10039  -  
1999 188  4670  7019  -  
2000 348  5443  6711  -  
2001 754  5066  4543  -  
2002 823  5373  5324  -  
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Table C 5. Number of new sedan cars sold by year and make of car 
Make of car 
Year 
Alfa Romeo Audi BMW Bentley Buick Cadillac 
1994 -  1008  265  -  2  10  
1995 -  1712  145  -  -  4  
1996 -  2128  891  -  -  -  
1997 -  2298  1561  -  -  -  
1998 218  1772  1845  -  -  -  
1999 341  1305  1560  -  -  -  
2000 169  950  1355  -  -  -  
2001 96  1735  1114  2  -  -  
2002 42  944  979  1  -  -  
Make of car 
Year 
Chevrolet Chrysler Daewoo Daihatsu Fiat Ford 
1994 5  230  -  3  34  1351  
1995 -  2090  348  -  38  1018  
1996 8  1730  408  -  5  1169  
1997 17  1136  412  -  62  1280  
1998 -  783  219  -  37  669  
1999 57  755  90  -  17  603  
2000 49  387  109  -  -  450  
2001 12  97  121  -  -  878  
2002 4  100  3  -  -  373  
Make of car 
Year 
Honda Hyundai Jaguar Kia Lada Lancia 
1994 1180  2026  -  130  186  -  
1995 727  1981  -  998  84  -  
1996 1090  1658  -  787  33  1  
1997 953  1374  -  577  10  11  
1998 499  709  61  233  7  2  
1999 490  576  54  57  1  10  
2000 464  527  24  144  -  8  
2001 365  287  19  33  -  -  
2002 56  120  36  18  -  -  
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Table C 5 (cont.). Number of new sedan cars sold by year and make of car 
Make of car 
Year 
Lexus Maserati Mazda Mercedes Benz Mitsubishi Nissan 
1994 -  -  941  -  2176  1828  
1995 -  -  938  -  2639  2172  
1996 -  -  1544  -  2383  2650  
1997 -  -  1074  -  3109  2485  
1998 -  -  1021  -  2706  1831  
1999 82  -  709  -  1520  975  
2000 129  1  731  -  929  986  
2001 74  -  565  1231  509  623  
2002 43  -  530  1378  536  238  
Make of car 
Year 
Opel Peugeot Renault Rover Saab Seat 
1994 4111  1371  286  -  180  222  
1995 3375  1156  129  -  230  525  
1996 4686  2376  28  219  147  346  
1997 2988  1449  488  248  174  330  
1998 1868  684  220  254  674  187  
1999 2102  667  21  441  434  136  
2000 1378  809  17  311  247  182  
2001 874  770  27  149  277  159  
2002 1064  352  2  94  506  104  
Make of car 
Year 
Skoda Subaru Suzuki Toyota Volkswagen Volvo 
1994 -  326  95  3552  1734  3292  
1995 -  256  222  3396  1417  2897  
1996 -  310  551  3995  1329  1254  
1997 -  249  225  3628  4709  1654  
1998 -  120  133  3278  2033  1620  
1999 -  120  153  2022  2290  1401  
2000 -  223  4  1871  1909  896  
2001 -  199  -  1388  1612  1315  
2002 134  227  -  1223  945  879  
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Table C 6. Number of new station wagons sold by year and make of car 
Make of car 
Year 
Audi BMW Chevrolet Chrysler Citroen Daewoo 
1994 1292  31  -  106  360  -  
1995 541  11  7  125  689  -  
1996 1935  207  2  76  1465  -  
1997 2028  629  3  473  1465  33  
1998 2623  663  4  186  1196  6  
1999 1951  697  2  97  1336  3  
2000 1714  1052  2  326  1476  118  
2001 1676  1017  1  122  1407  206  
2002 2184  953  -  35  1615  15  
Make of car 
Year 
Daihatsu Dodge Fiat Ford Ford USA Honda 
1994 -  -  44  5252  -  1  
1995 -  -  36  5429  -  28  
1996 -  6  16  3217  -  68  
1997 -  2  189  4586  27  1137  
1998 205  -  267  3275  25  2032  
1999 213  1  104  3120  -  1809  
2000 147  -  74  3077  -  1559  
2001 95  -  76  4596  -  927  
2002 148  -  1  3585  -  1486  
Make of car 
Year 
Hyundai Jeep Kia Lada Land Rover Lexus 
1994 -  51  7  -  -  -  
1995 -  59  38  17  -  -  
1996 1  42  30  11  -  -  
1997 28  29  19  2  48  -  
1998 68  18  28  2  158  -  
1999 1137  70  197  -  752  -  
2000 2032  31  206  -  602  16  
2001 1809  7  158  -  271  17  
2002 1559  37  91  -  438  20  
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Table  C 6 (cont.). Number of new station wagons sold by year and make of car 
Make of car 
Year 
Mazda Mercedes Benz Mitsubishi Nissan Opel Peugeot 
1994 299  -  1044  843  3032  736  
1995 68  -  1088  114  3201  719  
1996 20  -  1394  220  3132  441  
1997 1  -  2206  589  5410  1542  
1998 1669  -  2005  1034  4385  1917  
1999 1735  -  2453  1015  5260  2033  
2000 1283  -  2040  894  4801  2400  
2001 866  890  510  581  4303  1957  
2002 833  786  1232  2160  2899  2921  
Make of car 
Year 
Pontiac Renault Rover Saab Seat Skoda 
1994 10  10  -  -  -  88  
1995 4  273  -  -  -  61  
1996 3  1679  -  -  -  847  
1997 -  2472  -  -  11  597  
1998 -  2225  -  -  315  652  
1999 -  1868  -  696  276  1617  
2000 -  2246  -  479  156  1729  
2001 -  1914  37  616  119  1949  
2002 -  1812  41  756  94  1551  
Make of car 
Year 
Sangyong Subaru Suzuki Toyota Volkswagen Volvo 
1994 1  134  20  1036  3629  2155  
1995 4  130  43  1026  3199  3012  
1996 1  207  649  3997  5964  2361  
1997 1  409  602  4373  3277  3666  
1998 1  1605  2439  3909  5105  3917  
1999 8  1466  1690  3304  4591  1542  
2000 1  1248  1350  4840  4610  1310  
2001 3  990  994  5666  5615  1358  
2002 1  1214  806  6986  4826  2519  
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Table C 7. Hedonic regression for new cars wagon1) 
Variable Parameter 
estimate t-value 
Intercept 11.5331  756.6  
Fuel consumption×10-4 0.37  0.4  
Performance kw 0.0102  119.6  
1994 0.1600  16.6  
1995 0.1536  15.9  
1996 0.0987  11.0  
1997 0.0870  9.5  
1998 0.0544  6.1  
1999 0.0214  2.4  
2000 -0.0045  -0.5  
2001 0.0019  0.2  
Alfa Romeo 0.0097  0.4  
Audi 0.1708  14.0  
BMW 0.1443  10.9  
Bentley 0.2557  2.3  
Cadillac -0.0142  -0.1  
Chevrolet 0.2440  3.1  
Chrysler -0.0009  -0.0  
Citroen -0.0020  -0.1  
Daewoo -0.2297  -10.1  
Daihatsu -0.1466  -4.9  
Dodge 0.2076  2.6  
Fiat -0.1422  -6.5  
Ford -0.0272  -2.0  
Ford USA 0.3675  3.3  
Honda -0.0298  -1.7  
Hyundai -0.1959  -10.3  
Jaguar 0.0163  0.5  
Jeep 0.3651  13.1  
Kia -0.1310  -5.1  
Lada -0.4280  -11.8  
Lancia 0.0141  0.2  
Land Rover 0.3767  12.7  
Lexus 0.1761  3.3  
Maserati -0.1592  -1.0  
Mazda -0.0333  -2.2  
1)
 Reference year: 2002. Reference make is Volvo and reference body group  
is Station wagon. 
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Table C 7 (cont.) 
Variable Parameter 
estimate t-value 
Mercedes Benz 0.2842  14.3  
Mistubishi 0.0375  2.6  
Nissan 0.0151  1.0  
Opel -0.0237  -1.9  
Peugeot -0.0091  -0.7  
Pontiac 0.2011  2.8  
Renault -0.0614  -3.8  
Rover -0.0376  -1.6  
Saab 0.0491  2.9  
Seat -0.0890  -5.6  
Skoda -0.1297  -7.8  
Ssangyong 0.4815  6.7  
Subaru -0.0233  -1.4  
Suzuki -0.1775  -8.7  
Toyota -0.0269  -1.9  
Volkswagen 0.0316  2.6  
Combi -0.1859  -32.2  
Sedan -0.0642  -11.7  
# Observations  
R2  
1)
 Reference year: 2002. Reference make is Volvo and reference body group is Station wagon. 
 
